In "The Moral Problem", Michael Smith at one point (page 10) says that, if we accept the Humean picture of moral psychology, "I should not think that the claim that people in circumstances like mine should give to famine relief is itself objective. For there is no reason to suppose that others could be brought to agree with me by means of a rational argument."
I haven't got far into the book yet, but the connection between objectivity and 'others being brought to agreement by rational argument' seems to be something the Smith thinks is right. And the connection here seems to be a claim that the possibility of people being brought to agree on a topic by means of 'rational argument' is necessary for claims about that topic to be objective.
Here's the question: should we understand this as meaning "solely by means of a rational argument" or just "in part by means of a rational argument"? If the former, then how is this not far too strong (e.g. Jeff is objectively taller than me, but that's not something argument alone could show)? If the latter, then how is this not so weak as to be inapplicable in the way Smith wants it to be (e.g. if we're allowed to pick desires to combine with rational arguments, then a Humean can say that agreement can be reached on any topic by means of rational argument)?
I really should stop fighting jet lag now and go to sleep.
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I have a hypothetical question: What would it mean if during your co-op shift you kept thinking about how the co-op's basement would be the ideal place to wait out a zombie invasion? Just think about it - there aren't any windows and there's a lot of non-perishable, organic healthy food. Plus there's lots of good beer to pass the days.
ReplyDeleteAs for your question: pbbbbbbt!
'Pbbbbbbt' sounds right. Thanks.
ReplyDeleteAs for your 'hypothetical' zombie question: the co-op basement only seems like the ideal place, until you realize that you forgot about the rear elevator and oh my god they're coming through and then get backed into the freezer and then have to fight your way out using shards of frozen tilapia. So it's not nearly as good an idea as it sounds.
Could "there is no reason to suppose that others could be brought to agree with me by means of a rational argument" just be another way of saying "there is no reason to suppose that others would be rational to give to charity"? i.e., I'm rational to give to charity, in light of my desires and aims, but you may not be, in light of yours?
ReplyDeleteThat would make sense. The main difference between Humean antirealists and Kantian antirealists is that Kantians think that there's something that every rational agent has to value (if he values anything at all) and Humeans deny that; they think that you can hate freedom, happiness, humanity, etc. without making a mistake, provided you have weird enough desires and aims.
Maybe this is all Smith means here?
Glad to see you got there safe. I added another major chord to my "Colin is away" song accordingly.
What's the rule for adding chords to the song? Is it going to turn into a rock opera by the time I'm back?
ReplyDeleteThat does seem to be what Smith means - but if so, then his use of 'objective claim' in practical contexts is much more restrictive than how we think about objective claims in other contexts. That's what was bugging me.
Eventually I may have to add new sections to the song. Right now everything -- verses, chorus, etc. -- has the same exact chord progression, so there's plenty of room for growth.
ReplyDeleteBut to answer your question, I stuck a C in between the F and the last Em. So it now goes Am Am Em Em F F C Em.
(If you hadn't gotten there safe, my tentative plan was to switch the F to a Dm.)
Anyway, he probably just means the same thing by "objective" that you do in your paper: a moral claim is objective iff it applies to everyone. Again, this is precisely what Kantians assert and Humeans deny.
Maybe throw in an A7 Dm for a transition?
ReplyDeleteThat may be the sense objective he thinks he's getting at, but Smith (and I take it, other Kantians) says stuff that goes way beyond it - namely, that an objective moral claim would be one which anyone could be convinced of by rational argument. One way to get that (Kant's, I think) is to say that morality applies to all and only rational beings, that morality can apply to you only if you're necessarily in a position to be convinced of it. Smith says some stuff that suggests that's where he's coming from. But those are some heavy assumptions (especially the first).
What I'm especially unsure of, though, is why Smith thinks that such a feature (being something any rational being could be argued into accepting) is what would make a claim objective - instead of a moral general feature like "being something that any being who fails to believe is missing out on something epistemically." The latter feature would apply equally well in capturing, say, what makes it objectively true that the sun will explode. So why not go for a univocal conception of objectivity?
How would you gloss the Humeans position?